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I.  INTRODUCTION 
We all think we are the foremost authority when it comes to our personal health. 
We are consciously selective in what we tell our doctors, we confidently use 
WedMD.com to self-diagnose illnesses, and we even think we are savvy enough to 
                                                          
* Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, '11. I would like to thank Dr. Luther J. Blackwell, Jr. 
But for your guidance, I would have spent the next thirty years pushing papers around a 
cubical in the basement of some human resources company. I would also like to thank 
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make the medical determination of whether we should receive a flu shot each fall. 
We feel assured knowing that no one knows or can alter our medical identity without 
our consent or at least our knowledge. But what if someone can?  
In 2009, Brandon Sharp, a 37-year-old manager at an oil and gas company in 
Houston, Texas,1 was creating his version of the American dream. He was about to 
get married, buy his first home, and was in perfect physical condition.2 Before 
applying for a mortgage, Mr. Sharp requested a copy of his credit report.3 Much to 
his chagrin, his credit report revealed several collection notices under his name for 
emergency room visits throughout the country and a $19,000 bill for a life flight 
service.4 
Mr. Sharp, like an increasing number of Americans, had fallen victim to a crime 
known as medical identity theft. The crime, defined as the theft or unauthorized use 
of another’s personal information to obtain medical goods and services,5 is 
dangerous because it alters the victim’s medical identity without the victim’s 
knowledge and may never be detected.6 Additionally, because there is no national 
centralized repository for medical records, every time a thief uses the victim’s 
medical identity, a record is created that could be easily mistaken for the victim’s 
medical record.7  
This note explains the severity of medical identity theft and the state and federal 
legislative reactions to the problem. Specifically, the note discusses data breach 
notification statutes that require healthcare providers to notify consumers when the 
systems holding customer personal information are breached.8 The note concludes 
that Ohio’s data breach notification statute, which does not expressly cover 
healthcare providers,9 should be amended to protect residents from medical identity 
theft and provide redress when healthcare providers10 violate state law.  
                                                          
 1 Walecia Konrad, Medical Problems Could Include Identity Theft, N.Y. TIMES, June 
13, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/13/health/13patient.html. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Pat Curry, How to Prevent and Cure Medical ID Theft, CREDITCARDS.COM (Dec. 
29, 2008), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/how-to-prevent-medical-id-identity-
theft-1282.php.    
 6 Id.  Generally a victim will never know he is a victim of medical identity theft, unless 
he receives notice of an unpaid medical bill for treatment he has never received. See id. 
 7 See id.  
 8 See  Sasha Romanosky et. Al., Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity 
Theft?, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., at 1 (May 2008), 
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/research/241full.pdf. 
 9 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19(F)(2) (LexisNexis 2010). See also Department of 
Health and Human Services General Administrative Requirements, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 
(2010).   
 10 For purposes of this note, the term “healthcare providers” will be used interchangeably 
with the term “HIPAA Covered Entities.” 
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Section II of this note describes the nationwide problem of medical identity theft. 
It begins with an overview of data breach and general identity theft. The section then 
explains the difference between general identity theft and medical identity theft, and 
why the latter is more harmful to the victim.   
Section III illustrates the federal legislative response to data breaches in the 
healthcare industry. The section also explains how all healthcare providers are 
subject to the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (hereinafter “HIPAA”). The section explains the Act’s 2009 
amendments, known as the Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Act. Lastly, the third section illustrates the interaction between state and 
federal law, and how federal legislation allows for state regulations regarding data 
breaches. 
Section IV provides an overview of the current Ohio law on data breach 
notification. The section articulates how and when the Ohio law applies. And most 
importantly, it explains that Ohio’s data breach notification statute does not apply to 
healthcare providers. 
Lastly, Section V provides several suggestions that will ensure Ohio is better able 
to protect its residents from medical identity theft through an amended data breach 
notification statute. Specifically, the section offers four proposals: (1) Ohio should 
make its data breach laws applicable to healthcare providers; (2) healthcare providers 
doing business in Ohio should not have any discretion when it comes to notifying 
patients when their data systems have been breached; (3) Ohio’s data breach 
legislation should require healthcare providers to destroy patient’s personal 
information when they dispose of it; and (4) Ohio’s legislation should provide a 
mechanism for victims of medical identity theft to have access to monetary penalties 
from healthcare providers who violate the amended state law. 
While it is undisputed that medical identity theft is a fast growing and fairly 
complex crime, there is no justifiable reason why Ohio should punt its ability to 
protect Ohio residents from medical identity theft to the federal government. As this 
note dictates, there are several concerns that favor and disfavor state laws that 
address consumer protection from medical identity theft. After weighing these 
concerns, however, the state legislature should be a driving force rather than a 
complacent participant in the fight against medical identity theft. 
II.  DATA BREACH, IDENTITY THEFT, AND MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT 
There are three actions that involve the unauthorized acquisition or misuse of an 
individual’s personal information that may harm an individual. The first is the breach 
of an organization’s information storage system containing consumer data. The 
second is identity theft. The third is a more severe form of identity theft known as 
medical identity theft. This section distinguishes the three actions and further 
explains the severe effects of medical identity theft. 
A.  Data Breach 
The heart of data breach is personal information. In general terms, personal 
information is any data that identifies a particular person.11  Organizations collect 
                                                          
 11 See Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal 
Identifying Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 91, 93 (2009). This includes social security numbers, mothers’ maiden names, 
employment addresses, home addresses, and other personally identifiable information. See id. 
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this personal information because it creates an efficient way to provide goods and 
services.12 At the same time, this collection creates a prime target for identity 
thieves.13 
The unauthorized acquisition of, or access to, records containing an individual’s 
personal information constitutes a security breach. 14 Often times, data breaches 
result in unauthorized access to only a small number of records. For example, in 
2008, a 38-year-old Avon Lake, Ohio man spent a measly $115 for a spyware 
program that enabled him to view details of medical procedures, diagnostic notes, 
and other confidential information of 62 hospital patients.15 Data breaches can also 
result in access to an enormous amount of personal information. For example, a 
laptop containing the social security numbers of approximately 2,000 current and 
former school employees from Springfield City Schools in Ohio was stolen from a 
state auditor’s car, which was parked in his home garage.16 
Just as data breaches can occur in numerous sizes, they also occur in several 
forms. For instance, hackers can use the Internet illegally to retrieve information 
stored in computer systems.17 Individuals can also physically steal computers, data 
storage equipment, and paper files.18 Additionally, personal information can be 
improperly displayed or thrown away, allowing sensitive data to be viewed by those 
who should not have access.19 And finally, a disgruntled or opportunistic employee 
may also be the source of data breach.20 
                                                          
 12 See id. at 95. 
 13 See id. Since 2005, over 345 million records containing personal information have been 
involved in security breaches in the United States. See Chronology of Data Breaches, 
PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach (last 
updated Sept. 6, 2010). 
 14 See Neal G. Walters, Into the Breach: Security Breaches and Identity Theft, AARP 
PUB. POLICY INST. (July 2006), http://www.aarp.org/technology/privacy-security/info-
2006/dd142_security_breach.html.  
 15 See Robert McMillan, Misdirected Spyware Infects Ohio Hospital, PCWORLD (Sept. 
17, 2009), 
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/172185/misdirected_spyware_infects_ohio_h
ospital.html. The spyware gave the man access to the information when the person he sent the 
software to opened it on a hospital computer. See id. “He was also able to obtain e-mail and 
financial records of four…hospital employees.” Id. 
 16 See Andrew McGinn, Laptop with City School Employees’ Information Stolen, 
SPRINGFIELD NEWS-SUN (Mar. 16, 2007), 
http://www.springfieldnewssun.com/hp/content/oh/story/news/local/2007/03/16/sns031707lap
top.html.  
 17 See Walters, supra note 14. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See id. [F]or example, printing Social Security numbers on address labels, inadvertently 
making sensitive personal information accessible on Internet sites that can be viewed by the 
general public, or not properly disposing of files containing sensitive personal information.” 
Id. 
 20 See Jonathan J. Darrow & Stephen D. Lichtenstein, “Do You Really Need My Social 
Security Number?” Data Collection Practices in the Digital Age, 10 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 1, 
15-16 (2008).   
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When a data breach occurs, it can be costly to the individual whose information 
has been compromised, as well as to the company that had its data system 
breached.21 The individual may have to monitor his credit for years, if not a 
lifetime.22 The organization, in many cases, must bear the cost of notifying the 
individuals whose information has been stolen. When a publically traded company is 
involved, there is a significant, negative effect on the company’s stock price. 23  The 
company may also be liable for damages if a customer brings a successful civil 
action based on common law principles or violations of federal and state data breach 
notification statutes.24 Even if the suit is unsuccessful, the litigation cost alone can be 
an unexpected and substantial expenditure. Overall, a data breach’s effect can be 
considerable, but in many cases it is just the tip of the iceberg. 
B.  Identity Theft 
While data breaches pose a serious threat to the privacy of personal information, 
most people fear what happens after a data breach has occurred. A data breach 
exposes personal information that is lawfully used by many organizations to open 
new accounts, verify information, and make changes to existing accounts. Identity 
theft occurs when an individual uses another person’s identifying information, 
without permission, to commit fraud or other crimes.25 
An identity thief uses the personal information in a variety of ways. He may open 
a new credit card account in the victim’s name or change the billing address on a 
victim’s account, while accumulating charges26 on the credit line.27 Identity thieves 
                                                          
 21 Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Emerging Technology and Employee Privacy: Symposium: The 
Emergence of State Data Privacy and Security Laws Affecting Employers, 25 HOFSTRA 
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 483, 485 (2008).  The average laptop contains data worth $972,000 and 
according to a Federal Bureau of Investigation Computer Crime Survey, the average annual 
cost of computer security incidents in the U.S. is $67.2 billion. Id. 
 22 Chad Pinson, New Legal Frontier: Mass Information Loss and Security Breach, 11 
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 27, 31-32 (2007). 
 23 See Sasha Romanosky et. al., Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity Theft?, 
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., at 4 (May 2008), 
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/research/241full.pdf.   
 24 See Pinson, supra note 22, at 37. “[I]ndividuals whose information has been 
compromised have sought legal redress against organizations from which their information 
was taken using a variety of statutory and common law theories.” Id. at 32. “These cases may 
prove to be the leading edge in an effort to set new standards for the care and safeguarding of 
personal information.” Id. 
 25 See About Identity Theft, FTC, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/consumers/about-identity-theft.html, (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2010). “The [Federal Trade Commission] estimates that as many as 9 million 
Americans have their identities stolen each year.” Id.  
 26 See id. “While fraudulent charges on a victim’s credit card are the most common form 
of financial fraud, such charges are easily removed from a victim’s bill.”  Robert Lemos, 
Stolen Lives, YOURSECURITYSOURCE.COM (Aug. 26, 2009), 
http://www.robertlemos.com/journalism/2009/08/index.html (follow “Symantec’s 
YourSecurityResource” hyperlink). 
 27 See FTC, supra note 25.  
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may also create counterfeit checks using the victim’s name and account number, or 
take out a loan in the victim’s name.28 An identity thief may even get a driver’s 
license or official ID card in the victim’s name with the thief’s picture on it.29 In 
2009 alone, the number of identity theft victims in the United States increased 12 
percent from the previous year to 11.1 million people.30 In 2008, the Federal Trade 
Commission reported that 8,237 Ohioans were identity theft victims.31 
The number of identity theft victims is increasing because committing the crime 
is relatively simple, while catching and prosecuting identity thieves is extremely 
difficult.32 The difficulty begins with discovering whether the crime has even 
occurred. In many cases, “the victim may not realize that her identity has been stolen 
until months or years after the fact.”33 This delay between the crime’s commission 
and its discovery makes it nearly impossible for law enforcement to find the 
criminal.34 Even though identity theft causes the victim financial harm, the victim in 
most cases is able to rectify the event by working with creditors and credit 
monitoring agencies.35 On average, the victim is made whole after twenty-one hours 
of working with law enforcement and creditors to clean up the effects of identity 
theft.36 While the effects of identity theft are inconvenient for the victim, the 
                                                          
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. Children’s identities are increasingly at risk. See Lemos, supra note 26. Criminals 
prefer using children “because parents are less likely to monitor their children’s financial 
information.” Id.  
 30 See Javelin Study Finds Identity Fraud Reached New High in 2009, but Consumers Are 
Fighting Back, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/javelin-study-finds-identity-fraud-reached-new-high-in-2009-but-consumers-are-
fighting-back-83987287.html. Javelin Strategy & Research and leading companies in financial 
services and identity fraud prevention technology and resolution produced this comprehensive 
identity fraud survey. See id. “The survey is the nation's longest-running study of identity 
fraud, with more than 29,000 U.S. respondents over the past seven years.”  Id.  
 31 See Letter from Richard Cordray, Ohio Attorney General, to Ted Strickland et al., 
Governor et al. (Nov. 1, 2009), 2009 Identity Theft Annual Report, at 1, available at 
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/getattachment/dc78834d-4df5-4a91-b180-
291f07f5efde/2009-Identity-Theft-PASSPORT-Program-Report.aspx. This is up 20 percent 
from the two previous years. See id. It places Ohio in the middle of the pack of all states in the 
number of annual identity theft incidents. See id. 
 32 See Darrow & Lichtenstein, supra note 20, at 25.   
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. It is estimated that over 90% of identity thieves are never caught or convicted. 
See id. 
 35 See PR NEWSWIRE, supra note 30. Generally it takes a consumer around 21 hours or 
over half a workweek to straighten out creditors when their identity has been stolen. See id. 
 36 See Tiffany Hsu, Identity Fraud on the Rise – Up 12% to 11.1 Million Adults Affected in 
2009, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Feb. 10, 2010), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2010/02/identity-fraud-on-the-rise-up-12-to-111-
million-adults-affected-in-2009.html. The twenty-one hours represents the individual hours it 
will take a person to clean up the effects of having his identity stolen. See id. It does not mean 
twenty-one hours in the sense of within twenty-one hours after discovering the theft, the 
victim’s information will be cleared. See id. In addition to the twenty-one hours it takes to 
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financial industry and law enforcement have become increasingly effective at 
assisting consumers to correct instances of identity theft.37 There is, however, an area 
of identity theft where the victim’s complete recovery is not as simple or even 
guaranteed. 
C.  Medical Identity Theft 
While identity theft receives a great deal of media coverage, few realize that 
there are separate and distinct forms of the crime. Every year, three percent of all 
identity theft victims, or approximately 330,00038 people, fall victim to medical 
identity theft.39 “Medical identity theft refers to the misuse40 of an individual’s 
personally identifiable information”41 “such as a name, date of birth, social security 
number, or insurance policy number to obtain or bill for medical services or medical 
goods.”42 An alarming example of medical identity theft is the situation that occurred 
to Anndorie Sachs.43 A hospital notified Sachs that her newborn baby “tested 
                                                          
clear up a case of identity theft, the victim, on average, will spend $373 in out-of-pocket 
expenses, unreimbursed losses, legal fees, and time taken off work. See id. 
 37 See PR NEWSWIRE, supra note 30. In 2009, it was estimated that the time it takes to 
correct the effects of identity theft decreased 30% from the previous year. Hsu, supra note 36. 
 38 Based on the 2009 estimate of 11.1 million identity theft victims. See PR NEWSWIRE, 
supra note 30. 
 39 Synovate, Federal Trade Commission-2006  Identity Theft Survey Report, 21 (Nov. 
2007), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/11/SynovateFinalReportIDTheft2006.pdf.  
 40 Booz Allen Hamilton, Medical Identity Theft Environmental Scan, 4 (Oct. 15, 2008), 
http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_10731_850701_0_0_18/HHS%2
0ONC%20MedID%20Theft_EnvScan_101008_Final%20COVER%20NOTE.pdf. 
Id. at 5. For example, a consensual misuse is when a family member uses another family 
member’s health information to get a drug prescription. See id. The term “misuse” includes 
both consensual and nonconsensual forms of medical identity theft. See id. This article only 
focuses on nonconsensual misuse of medical information because the information is obtained 
through data breaches, which by definition are nonconsensual. See id. 
 41 Personally identifiable information is “any information about an individual maintained 
by an agency, including, but not limited to, education, financial transactions, medical history, 
and criminal or employment history and information which can be used to distinguish or trace 
an individual’s identity, such as their name, social security number, date and place of birth, 
mother’s maiden name, biometric records, etc., including any other personal information 
which is linked or linkable to an individual.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, OMB M-06-19, REPORTING INCIDENTS INVOLVING PERSONALLY 
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION AND INCORPORATING THE COSTS FOR SECURITY IN AGENT 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS  (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/OMB/memornada/fy2006/m06-19.pdf (reporting incidents involving personally 
identifiable information and incorporating the cost for security in agency information 
technology investments). 
 42 Hamilton, supra note 40, at 1.  
 43 See Caitlin A. Johnson, Protect Against Medical ID Theft, Medical ID Theft Nearly 
Ruined a Good Mother’s Life (Oct. 9, 2006), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/09/ 
earlyshow/living/ConsumerWatch/main2073225.shtml.     
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positive for illegal drugs.”44 Sachs was surprised by the call because she had not 
recently given birth to any children.45 The situation worsened the following day. Law 
enforcement officers threatened to take her actual four children away because of the 
positive drug test.46  Only after Sachs worked with the hospital and law enforcement 
officers was it discovered that someone had stolen her driver’s license and went to 
the hospital to give birth under her name.47  
This example is by no means the only way the crime is perpetrated. Medical 
identity theft occurs in many ways and each way potentially exposes the victim to 
the risk of having inaccurate information stored in his or her medical records.48 
Below are four common examples of how the crime is perpetrated: 
 
• “A person uses…the identity of another…to obtain medical care 
because the [person] is uninsured.”49 
• “A [person] uses the identity of another to obtain medical care because 
the [person] does not want [his] health records to include information 
about his . . . health status.” Specifically, the identity thief desires to 
prevent his current or future employer, or “insurance provider from 
knowing aspects of [his] true health condition.”50 
• A person uses the victim’s identity to obtain a drug prescription for 
recreational use or criminal distribution.51 
• A person obtains the victim’s health information. Then in a separate 
incident, the thief also steals the personal indentifying information 
needed to pose as a physician and submits claims for reimbursement to 
an insurance provider for services never rendered to any individual.52 
This is not uncommon and can “involve hundreds of identities and the 
submission of millions of dollars’ worth of false claims.”53 
                                                          
 44 Id. 
 45 See id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Hamilton, supra note 40, at 6. 
 49 Id.  
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. “The unique physician identification numbers (UPIN) that are used to bill both 
private insurance and Medicare/Medicaid are frequently compromised.” Kim McKay, Identity 
Theft Steals Millions from Government Health Programs, (Feb. 13, 2008), http://www.gov 
tech.com/gt/260202. Additionally, an individual who receives Medicare/Medicaid also has a 
special identification number. Id. This number is also frequently used to defraud both federal 
programs and private insurance. See id. For example, 38 people in Miami-Dade, Florida, 
defrauded the Medicare program for $142 million. Lesley Clark, Feds Arrest 38 in Medicare 
Fraud Crackdown, Miami Herald, May 10, 2007, http://www.aegis.com/news/mh/2007/ 
MH070501.html. The thieves defrauded the government of the price wheelchairs, walkers, 
and other equipment. See id. 
 53 Hamilton, supra note 40, at 6. 
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When data breach results in medical identity theft, the results can be even more 
severe than what occurs in regular identity theft.54 It is more severe because the 
results of medical identity theft do not simply affect the victim’s pecuniary interests; 
medical identity theft affects the victim’s health and privacy interests as well. 
Specifically, medical identity theft can “result in the exhaustion of the victim’s 
insurance benefits.”55  A victim may also “experience difficulties or delays in 
receiving future health care services or denial of coverage” altogether because of 
pre-existing conditions erroneously contained in the victim’s medical history.56 “The 
victim may be billed for deductibles, co-payments, or other costs the healthcare 
provider delivered to the thief.”57  
The victim’s privacy interest is also affected. Medical identity theft infringes on 
the trust that patients have with their healthcare providers, commonly referred to as a 
breach of trust.58 To illustrate, privacy is of major concern for clinical trial 
participants and others who have serious health problems.59 “[W]hen volunteers 
enroll in a clinical study, they place great trust in the researchers and study staff, 
expecting them to act both responsibility and ethically.”60 When these breaches of 
trust occur, “many individuals would feel a sacred trust was violated by healthcare 
providers and institutions.”61  
                                                          
 54 Stacy Bradford, Medical Identity Theft Can Happen to You (June 17, 2009), 
http://moneywatch.bnet.com/saving-money/blog/family-finance/medical-identity-theft-can-
happen-to-you/727/. The stakes are higher because “[u]nlike regular identity theft, this type of 
fraud could put your health in jeopardy and seems nearly impossible to prevent.” Id. 
Additionally, when regular identity theft occurs, the thief uses the information in financial 
transactions. These can be relatively easy to fix because all financial information is contained 
in a central location. For example, all credit information flows through credit monitoring 
agencies. In contrast, medical information is not stored in a central repository. “[H]ealth 
information often flows to different recipients, such as primary care providers, specialists, 
health care business associates, insurance plans, researchers, and others.” Hamilton, supra 
note 40, at 8. There are ways to counteract the theft of personal health information including 
examining the explanation of benefits forms, monitoring benefits by asking for a list of claims 
paid, and checking medical records and correcting inaccuracies. Id. at 31. 
 55 Hamilton, supra note 40, at 8. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. “Victims are burdened with the task of proving that they are not responsible for the 
charges, and if they cannot, records of these unpaid costs can affect their credit rating.” Id. 
 58 Ellen Nakashima & Rick Weiss, Patients’ Date on Stolen Laptop, Washington Post, 
Mar.24, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/03/23/AR2008032301753.html.  
 59 See id. 
 60 Id. 
 61  Mark A. Rothstein, Currents in Contemporary Ethics, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 507, 510 
(2009). A study indicated that only 1% of people surveyed would feel comfortable if medical 
researchers were free to use their personal health information without their consent. See A. F. 
Westin, How the Public Views Privacy and Health Research, 20 (2007), 
www.hca.wa.gov/hit/documents/westiniomsrvyreport1107.doc.    
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Regardless of how serious the previously mentioned medical identity theft 
injuries are, they pale in comparison to the most dangerous consequence of the 
crime: having incorrect health information entered into the victim’s medical 
records.62 This is particularly dangerous because a healthcare provider may rely on 
false health information and provide inappropriate care like “transfusing the wrong 
blood type, performing procedures that are unnecessary or even harmful,” or 
inadvertently prescribing medications that could cause an adverse reaction.63 Take, 
for example, what happened to Lind Weaver.64 Weaver, a 57-year-old from Palm 
Coast, Florida, received a bill in the mail from her local hospital requesting payment 
for the amputation of her right foot.65 After weeks of clearing up the mess with the 
hospital, including a hostile meeting with the hospital’s chief administrator where 
she stormed in and kicked her heels on his desk proclaiming, “Obviously, I have 
both of my feet,” all parties presumed that the matter was resolved.66 Unfortunately, 
it was not. When Weaver was hospitalized a year later for a hysterectomy, the nurse 
reviewing her chart said, “I see you have diabetes.”67 This alarmed Weaver, who was 
not a diabetic.68 But for the fact that Weaver was conscious while the nurse was 
reading the information, Weaver could have been seriously injured if not killed 
during the surgery.69 This example illustrates the true severity of medical identity 
theft and why regulations, both state and federal, should be proactive in their 
approach to preventing the crime. 
The reality, however, is that medical identity theft is on the rise. This rise can be 
attributed to the fact that the street value of personal medical information is more 
valuable than general personal information.70 For instance, credit card numbers and 
bank account personal identification numbers sell from $10 to $20, compared to 
$150 to $200 for documents containing personal medical information.71 Another 
reason, as fully explained later in this note, is that federal regulation regarding 
privacy of health information has been poorly enforced.72 
                                                          
 62 Hamilton, supra note 40, at 8. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Diagnosis: Identity Theft, Business Week, Jan. 8, 2007, http://www.businessweek.com/ 
magazine/content/07_02/b4016041,htm.  
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See Steve Lohr, The New Hacker Economics, N.Y. Times, May 8, 2008, 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/08/the-new-hacker-economics/. 
 71 Id. 
 72 See generally Rob Stein, Medical Privacy Law Nets No Fines, Washington Post, June 5, 
2006,  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/04/AR2006060400672.html. 
2010] OHIO’S “AGGRESSIVE” ATTACK 121 
 
Medical identity theft affects more than just the individual. It also affects 
payers,73 providers,74 federal agencies,75 and society as a whole.76 Payers, for 
example, bear the costs of services provided in incidents of medical identity theft.77 
It is also possible that they incur negative publicity, which could affect the 
business’s reputation and goodwill.78 Health care providers are affected in that they 
may rely on corrupted health records and improperly provide medical assistance to a 
patient.79 Even though “[the] law is not yet clear on legal actions that can be taken 
against a provider related to negligence, malpractice, or other legal action,” the 
defense costs and settlement offers alone could be significant.80  
Federal agencies are also affected by medical identity theft because of the cost of 
investigating crimes, prosecuting criminals, enforcing federal rules, and payouts to 
criminals as a direct fraud victim.81 For example, in 2007 the Department of Justice 
identified 120 cases of healthcare fraud.82 In financial terms, nearly three percent of 
national healthcare costs, or $60 billion, are fraud-related.83 Given that the federal 
government is the largest payer of healthcare costs, the financial impact of medical 
identity theft is substantial.84 
Finally, society as a whole suffers from the effects of medical identity theft. 
Private-pay patients pay more for healthcare since providers must offset the losses 
                                                          
 73 “[P]ayers are entities that accept responsibility for payment to providers on behalf of 
enrolled consumers. They include organizations and institutions such as health insurance 
plans, federal programs, and health care sponsors, such as employers or unions.” Hamilton, 
supra note 40, at 10. 
 74 “Health care providers are facilities that make health services available to consumers.  
These include hospitals, skilled nursing homes, long term care facilities, pharmacies, labs, and 
diagnostic facilities.” Nat’l Alliance for Health Info. Tech., Defining Key Health Information 
Technology Terms, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 20 (Apr. 28, 2008), 
http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_10741_848133_0_0_18/10_2_hit
_terms.pdf.   
 75 This includes Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Indian Health Services, 
Veterans Administration, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Justice, Federal 
Trade Commission, Department of Health and Human Services, and the Social Security 
Administration. Hamilton, supra note 40, at 13. 
 76 AHIMA e-HIM Work Group on Medical Identity Theft, Mitigating Medical Identity 
Theft, July 7, 2008, 7 Journal of AHIMA 79, (2008) AHIMA e-HIM Work Group on Medical 
Identity Theft, Mitigating Medical Identity Theft, 79 J. AHIMA 7, 63 (2008), available at 
http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/documents/ahima/bok1_039058.hcsp?dDocNam
e=bok1_039058. 
 77 Hamilton, supra note 40, at 11. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 AHIMA, supra note 76. 
 81 See Hamilton, supra note 40, at 13.  
 82 Id. at 14. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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they incur because of medical identity theft.85 Additionally, taxpayers essentially 
fund government medical benefit payouts for fraudulent claims and government 
agency investigations of medical fraud and identity theft.86 
With medical identity theft being such a severe crime, federal and state 
legislatures have enacted statutes in an attempt to prevent the crime from occurring. 
The next two sections explore the federal approach and Ohio’s approach to 
preventing medical identity theft. 
III.  FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO PREVENT MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT 
The threat of data breaches alone, separate and distinct from the threat of identity 
theft and medical identity theft, is of major concern for lawmakers in the United 
States.87 To deal with the issue of privacy, the federal government has separated 
privacy issues concerning healthcare from general concerns regarding the privacy of 
general personal information. The separation is without question due to the public’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy as it relates to medical information.88 Legislation 
in this area is likely to continue to develop because, as shown earlier, there are a 
variety of stakeholders who are adversely affected when data breaches and medical 
identity theft occurs. 
The most prominent federal regulation dealing directly with data breach of 
medical information is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (HIPAA),89 amended in 2009 by the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act).90 Though separately discussed in 
this note, they are one cohesive piece of federal legislation that imposes data breach 
notification requirements on healthcare providers when their information systems are 
breached. This scheme of data breach notification requirements is designed to be an 
effective tool to prevent medical identity theft from occurring; however, its lack of 
enforcement has not produced the type of results necessary to achieve a significant 
decrease in the number of medical identity theft cases occurring each year. 
                                                          
 85 See AHIMA, supra note 76. 
 86 Id.  
 87 The federal government has enacted specific regulatory schemes for protecting personal 
information. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act protects health 
information. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306. Financial Institutions are required to protect the data they 
possess under the Federal Trade Commissions’ Safeguards Rule. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 
(LexisNexis 2008). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act protects consumers’ personal financial 
information. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 138 (1999).  Finally, 
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act protects information gathered online about 
children under the age of thirteen. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506. 
 88 F. LAWRENCE STREET & MARK P. GRANT, LAW OF THE INTERNET §206(6) (Matthew 
Bender & Company, Inc. eds., 17th ed. 2009).. The reasonable expectation of privacy can be 
eliminated when patients sign waivers when receiving medical treatment. Id. Some waivers, 
when defined broadly may eliminate the reasonable expectation of privacy altogether. Id. 
 89 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 1936 (1996). 
 90 See Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH 
Act), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
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A.  HIPAA 
The primary privacy regulatory regime for the health care industry is HIPAA.91 
The Act was passed to “improve portability and continuity of health insurance 
coverage in the group and individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in 
health insurance . . . .”92 The Act’s regulations are very broad and cover nearly all 
healthcare entities.93 It applies to “health plans,94 health clearing houses,95 and health 
                                                          
 91 Christine Easter, Special Topic, Auditing for Privacy, 2 I/S J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. 
SOC’Y 879, 879 (2006).  
 92 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936, 1936 (1996) (emphasis added). 
 93 A health care provider includes a provider of services, a provider of medical or other 
health services, and any other person furnishing health care services or supplies. HIPPA, Pub. 
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2022 (1996). "Provider of services" means a hospital, critical 
access hospital, skilled nursing facility, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facility, home 
health agency, hospice program, or, a fund. Id; 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395x(u) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 94 A health plan means an individual or group plan that provides, or pays the cost of, 
medical care. It includes any of the following and any combination thereof:  
1. A group health plan, but only if the plan 
a. has 50 or more participants; or 
b. is administered by an entity other than the employer who established 
and maintains the plan. 
2. A health insurance issuer. 
3. A health maintenance organization. 
4. Part A and part B of the Medicare Program under title XVIII. 
5. The Medicaid program under title XIX. 
6. A Medicare supplemental policy. 
7. A long term care policy, including a nursing home fixed indemnity policy 
(unless the DHHS Secretary determines that such a policy does not provide 
sufficiently comprehensive coverage of a benefit so that the policy should be 
treated as a health plan). 
8. An employee welfare benefit plan or any other arrangement, which is 
established or maintained for the purpose of offering or providing health 
benefits to the employees of 2 or more employers. 
9. The health care program for active military personal under title 10 of the 
United States Code. 
10. The veterans health care program. 
11. The Civilian health and Medical Program of Uniformed Services. 
12. The Indian health service program. 
13. The Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan. 
HIPPA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2022-23 (1996). 
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care providers,96 who transmit any health information in electronic form in 
connection with a transaction.”97  
HIPAA has two key provisions. The first is the Security Rule, which protects 
electronic health information.98 Unfortunately, the rule is general and vague.99 For 
example, it requires covered entities to “ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of all electronic protected health information the covered entity creates, 
receives, maintains, or transmits.”100 Additionally, the rule requires each covered 
entity to protect against any reasonably anticipated unauthorized uses,101 “threats, or 
hazards to the security or integrity of information.”102 These examples show that the 
Security Rule is vague because it does not set out specific ways for covered entities 
to comply with these requirements. Instead, the Security Rule merely states that 
“covered entities may use any security measures that allow the covered entity to 
reasonably and appropriately implement the standards” listed in the Rule.103 This rule 
is aspirational rather than a concrete regulatory scheme where both the covered 
                                                          
 95 A health care clearinghouse is a public or private entity that processes or facilitates the 
processing of nonstandard data elements of health information into standard data elements. 
HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2021 (1996). 
 96 The term health care provider includes a provider of services, a provider of medical or 
other health services, and any other person furnishing health care services or supplies. 
HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2022 (1996). The term provider of services 
means a hospital, critical access hospital, skilled nursing facility, comprehensive outpatient 
rehabilitation facility, home health agency, hospice program, or a fund in certain instances. 42 
U.S.C. § 1395x(u) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 97 HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2023 (1996). 
 98 45 C.F.R. § 164.302 (LexisNexis 2010). The information includes “any information, 
whether oral or recorded in any form or medium, that is created or received by a health care 
provider, health plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or 
health care clearinghouse; and relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health 
or condition of an individual, the provision of health care to an individual, or the past, present, 
or future payment for the provision of heatlh care to an individual.” HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2022 (1996). 
 99 Easter, supra note 91, at 882. 
 100 45 C.F.R. 164.306(a)(1). 
 101 § 164.306(a)(3). 
 102 § 164.306(a)(2). 
 103 § 164.306(d)(1). In deciding how to meet the standards, the covered entity may consider 
the following factors: 
1. The size, complexity, and capabilities of the covered entity; 
2. The covered entity’s technical infrastructure, hardware, and 
software security capabilities; 
3. The costs of security measures; [and] 
4. The probability and criticality of potential risks to electronic 
protected health information. 
Id. 
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entities as well as the agency responsible for enforcing the regulation’s requirements 
know exactly when an entity is in or out of compliance.  
The second key provision is the Privacy Rule. “The rule [was designed to] 
establish the first set of basic national privacy standards and fair information 
practices that provides all Americans with a basic level of protection and peace of 
mind that is essential to their full participation in their care.”104 There are four 
relevant standards expressed in the Privacy Rule. The first is that a covered entity 
may not use or disclose personal health information, except as permitted or required 
by the rule.105 The permitted uses and disclosures include disclosures to the 
individual for treatment, payment, or otherwise in compliance with the rules, and 
incident to an otherwise permitted use.106 The second standard limits a covered 
entity’s use and disclosure of patient information when using the information for 
reasons other than treatment.107 The third standard is that covered entities must also 
use and disclose personal health information subject to any agreed upon restriction 
the entity may have made with the patient.108 Finally, an individual has a right to be 
notified of a covered entity’s uses and disclosures of his protected health 
information.109 
The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS 
Secretary) enforces HIPAA.110 This department has promulgated and codified 
rules.111 To enforce HIPAA’s requirements, the DHHS Secretary can hear 
complaints or it can conduct compliance audits on its own.112 “Despite possessing 
the authority to independently conduct compliance reviews, the DHHS primarily 
relies on a complaint-driven system that refrains from initiating any sort of 
‘widespread effort to audit and detect violations.’”.113 The enforcement strategy as a 
whole was purposely designed “as a reactive, rather than a proactive, process.”114 
                                                          
 104 See HIPAA Privacy Rule, RUTGERS UNIV. DIV. OF INFO. PROT. AND SEC., (Mar. 5, 2009, 
3:14 PM), http://rusecure.rutgers.edu/content/hipaa-privacy-rule.  
 105 45 C.F.R. 164.502. 
 106 Id. There are other permitted uses as well as some required disclosures. 
 107 See id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 45 C.F.R. § 164.520. There are many exceptions to this rule including exceptions for 
group health plans and inmates. See id. 
 110 Carlos A. Leyva & Deborah L. Leyva, HIPAA Survival Guide for Providers: Privacy 
and Security Rules 1, 7 (2009 – 2010), http://www.hipaasurvivalguide.com/hipaa-survival-
guide.pdf.  
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 16; 45 C.F.R. § 160.306; 45 C.F.R. §160.308. 
 113 Tobi M. Murphy, Comment, Enforcement of the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Moving From 
Illusory Voluntary Compliance to Continuous Compliance Through Private Accreditation, 54 
LOY. L. REV. 155, 171 (2008).  
 114 Id.; Kevin Fogarty, Stitching up Health Records: Privacy Compliance Lags, eWEEK 
(Apr. 16, 2006), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Health-Care-IT/Stitching-Up-Health-Records-
Privacy-Compliance-Lags (confirming the preference by DHHS that problems between or 
within organizations be settled independently). 
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A major flaw in HIPAA’s Security and Privacy Rules, as originally enacted, was 
that it did not provide covered entities with instructions on what to do when data 
systems were breached. Additionally, the Security and Privacy Rules were vague and 
overly general, leading to a lack of governmental follow-through in the area of 
enforcement.115 For example, as of July 31, 2010, the Office of Civil Rights, which 
enforces both the Privacy and Security Rules under the direction of the Health and 
Human Services Department, had received approximately 53,789 complaints of 
privacy violations, of which 17,381 were referred for additional investigation.116 The 
Office of Civil Rights then dismissed 5,960 (34%) complaints as non-violations of 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule and resolved the remaining 11,421 (66%) complaints 
through informal actions.117 At this time, none of the investigations conducted by the 
Health and Human Services Department have resulted in the issuance of a single 
civil penalty.118 In addition, between April 30, 2003 and July 31, 2010, only 474 
(less than 1%) of the greater than 53,000 complaints received by the Office of Civil 
Rights were referred to the Department of Justice for criminal investigation.119 This 
lack of government follow through led one commentator to assert that the Act is 
“like dad telling the kids he’s going to count to three and then saying, “One . . . two . 
. . two and half . . . two and three quarters . . . .”120  
Because HIPAA did not have data breach notification instructions and its 
requirements were vague, Congress amended it in 2009 to provide requirements that 
are more concrete.121 The data breach notification rules were published on August 
24, 2009 and became effective September 23, 2009.122 
B.  The HITECH Act Amends HIPAA 
In 2009, the HITECH Act was passed to amend HIPAA.123 President Obama 
signed the Act as part of the $787 billion economic American Recovery and 
                                                          
 115 See Gienna Shaw, Does Anybody Care About HIPAA Anymore?, HEALTHLEADERS 
MEDIA (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/TEC-246265/Does-
Anybody-Care-About-HIPAA-Anymore.  
 116 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HIPAA Enforcement Highlights - Numbers at a 
Glance, HHS.gov, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/highlights/indexnumbers.html#total%20in
vestigated (last updated July 31, 2010). 
 117 Id. 
 118 See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 116. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Shaw, supra note 115. 
 121 See Womble Carlyle, Action Required: HIPAA Security Breach Notification Rules 
(Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.wcsr.com/client-alerts/action-required-hipaa-security-breach-
notification-rules-effective-september-23-2009-additional-hitech-act-provisions-effective-
early-next-year.  
 122 See id. 
 123 Dom Nicastro, Economic Stimulus Act Heightens HIPAA Enforcement, HCPro (Feb. 17, 
2009), 
http://healthplans.hcpro.com/content.cfm?content_id=228444&topic=WS_HLM2_HEP.  
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Reinvestment Act of 2009, commonly referred to as the “Stimulus Package.”124 This 
amendment is significant because the “Stimulus Package” provides financial 
incentives for healthcare organizations that are willing to take steps to utilize 
Electronic Health Record technology.125 As a string attached to these financial 
incentives, the Act requires certain security measures to be taken to protect patient 
information.126 The Act is significant in this context because it specifies security 
breach notification requirements for covered entities.127 
The HITECH Act requires HIPAA covered entities dealing with unsecured 
personal health information128 to notify each individual whose unsecured protected 
health information has been breached129 or is reasonably believed to have been 
accessed, acquired, or disclosed as a result of a breach.130  The covered entity must 
give the notice within 60 calendar days after discovering a breach.131  When the 
covered entity provides notice, it must include: 
                                                          
 124 Id. 
 125 Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis, LLP, Stimulus Package Provides Incentives for the 
Use of Health Information Technology, Electronic Health Records, Feb. 14, 2009, 
http://www.wallerlaw.com/articles/2009/02/14/stimulus-package-provides-incentives-for-the-
use-of-health-information-technology-electronic-health-records.8163. The “Stimulus 
Package” states that healthcare providers, like doctors and hospitals, will be reimbursed by 
higher Medicare and Medicaid payments if they put the systems in place by 2011. See id. 
“Doctors can receive up to $60,000 and hospitals up to $11 million.” Tom Breen, Stimulus 
Gives Incentives for e-health Records, OmniMD (May 11, 2009), 
http://www.myemrstimulus.com/tag/doctors/.  
 126 Gregg Blesh, HHS’ New Civil Rights Chief to Enforce HIPAA, 
MODERNHEALTHCARE.COM (Sept. 16, 2009), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20090916/REG/309169988#. The Department of 
Health and Human Services reiterated the importance of performing HIPAA compliance 
audits. See id. In 2009, “[DHHS] Secretary Kathleen Sebelius appointed Georgina Verdugo, a 
former prosecutor and Clinton administration official to lead the department's [Office of Civil 
Rights], which recently took over enforcement of [HIPAA’s] security rule . . . ” Id. 
 127 Cynthia M. Conner et al., American Health Lawyers Association 2008-2009 Year in 
Review, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 41 (2009). The connection between the 2009 “Stimulus 
Package” and these breach notification requirements is that “The [“Stimulus Packacge”] 
contains billions to fund health IT for expanding the implementation and exchange of 
electronic records.” Nicastro, supra note 123. “To do [this] successfully and safely, Congress 
recognize[d] the need for broader and stronger, more explicit privacy and security controls.” 
See id. 
 128 In this context, “dealing with” means to, “access, maintain, retain, modify, record, store, 
destroy, or otherwise hold, use, or disclose unsecured protected health information.” See 
HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13402(a), 123 Stat. 115 (2009). “’Unsecured protected 
heath information’ means protected health information that is not secured through the use of 
technology or methodology specified by the [DHHS] Secretary.” See HITECH Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-5, § 13402(h)(1)(A), 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
 129 Breach means the “unauthorized acquisition, access, use or disclosure of protected 
health information, which compromises the security or privacy of such information…” 
HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13400(1)(A), 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
 130 HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13402(a), 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
 131  See id. at, § 13402(d)(1). 
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(1)  A brief description of what happened, including the date of the breach 
and the date the breach was discovered...; (2)  A description of the types 
of unsecured protected health information that [was] involved in the 
breach…; (3)  The steps individuals should take to protect themselves 
from potential harm resulting from the breach[;] (4) A brief description of 
what the covered entity is doing to investigate the breach, to mitigate 
losses, and to protect against any further breaches; and (5)  Contact 
procedures for individuals to ask questions or learn additional 
information, which shall include a toll-free telephone number, an e-mail 
address, website, or postal address.132 
The HITECH Act also provides each state’s attorney general the authority to 
enforce its provisions.133 For example, on January 15, 2010, Connecticut’s attorney 
general was the first to file a suit against a covered entity under the HITECH Act.134 
When a state’s attorney general has reason to believe that an interest of one or more 
of the residents of that state has been or is threatened by a person violating the Act, 
the attorney general may bring a civil action on behalf of the residents of the state in 
federal court.135 The attorney general may seek an injunction or statutory damages.136  
State attorneys general do not have exclusive authority to enforce the HITECH 
Act regulations. The DHHS Secretary also has the authority to assess civil monetary 
penalties and negotiate monetary settlements for HITECH Act violations.137 The 
money received from these penalties and settlements is sent to the Office for Civil 
Rights, which is an office of the Department of Health and Human Services, to be 
used to further enforce HIPAA’s requirements.138 As of the publication of this note, 
all monetary penalties and settlements recovered will go to the Officer for Civil 
Rights; however, the HITECH Act sets out a plan to get recommendations and 
implement a system that allows individuals harmed by HIPAA violations to receive 
a percentage of the money.139 This plan is to be executed within three years,140 but 
even when it is completed, individuals will not have access to civil awards won by 
                                                          
 132 Id. § 13402(f). 
 133 Id. § 13410(e).  
 134 Keith L. Martin, Conn. AG Sues Health Net Over “Ethically Unacceptable” Data 
Breach, IAFwebnews.com (Jan. 15, 2010), http://ifawebnews.com/2010/01/15/conn-ag-sues-
health-net-over-ethically-unacceptable-data-breach/. The attorney general filed suit against 
Health Net of Connecticut for a data breach jeopardizing the personal information of 446,000 
of its members. Id. “The [lawsuit] alleges that the insurer failed to effectively supervise and 
train its workforce on policies and procedures concerning the appropriate maintenance, use, 
and disclosure of protected health information.” Id. 
 135 HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13410(e), 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
 136 Id. The total amount of damages imposed may not exceed $25,000 in a calendar year. 
Additionally, if the attorney general brings a successful action, he may be awarded the costs of 
the action and reasonable attorney fees to the state. Id. 
 137 See id. § 13410(a). 
 138 Id. § 13410(c). 
 139 Id. § 13410(a). 
 140 See id. § 13410(c)(3). 
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their respective state attorney general.141 Unless the individual’s respective state law 
allows a citizen to recover a percentage of an action brought by a state attorney 
general, the individual will not have access to any monetary penalties won by the 
state attorney general under HIPAA.142 This distinction exists because the federal 
statute only governs the awards the DHHS Secretary receives.143 In other words, 
each state is responsible for enacting legislation to govern whether state residents 
harmed by a data breach will have access to monetary penalties awarded to their 
state’s attorney general and to what extent.144 
Even though the Act gives state attorneys general the right to enforce its 
provisions, this right is not absolute. Before an attorney general can file a civil 
action, he must provide notice to the DHHS Secretary.145 This is significant because 
the DHHS Secretary can intervene in the action.146 The text’s plain language leads to 
the inference that the DHHS Secretary can literally block civil actions initiated by a 
state attorney general.147 An additional issue is that the statute’s language allows for 
this intervention, but there is no restrictive language that allows a state attorney 
general to know when the intervention would be appropriate.148 This lack of 
restrictive language leads to the inference that at any time, and for any reason, the 
DHHS Secretary has the discretion to intervene in a civil action brought by a state 
attorney general. The DHHS Secretary’s ability to intervene may pose a serious 
threat to a state attorney general’s ability to enforce the new data breach notification 
requirements. 
Even if state attorneys general find it difficult to enforce HIPAA and its HITECH 
Act amendments, the federal statutory scheme gives states the authority, in specific 
instances, to enforce data breach notification requirements based on their own state 
laws. 
C.  Federal Preemption of State Laws 
While HIPAA is a robust federal regulatory scheme, it does not completely 
preempt state law. The Supremacy Clause stands for the proposition that the 
Constitution and the laws of the federal government are, in most cases, more forceful 
                                                          
 141 See id. § 13410(c)(1). 
 142 See id. 
 143 See id. For civil awards received by the DHHS Secretary, the HITECH Act directs that 
those funds “shall be transferred to the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health 
and Human Services to be used for purposes of enforcing the provisions of this subtitle . . . .” 
Id.  
 144 See id.  
 145 See id. § 13410(e). 
 146 See id. § 13410(e)(1). 
 147 “The State shall serve prior written notice of any action . . . upon the [DHHS] Secretary 
and provide the [DHHS] Secretary with a copy of its complaint . . . The [DHHS] Secretary 
shall have the right to intervene in the action.” Id.  
 148 See id. The only time where the Act specifically states that a state attorney general may 
not bring an action is when the DHHS Secretary has already instituted an action against a 
person. See id. 
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than state laws.149 Because of this, inconsistent state laws are generally preempted or 
trumped by federal laws.150 When the laws are not in conflict, preemption can either 
be implied or expressly stated in federal legislation.151  
Here, HIPAA expressly preempts state law and supports state law in certain 
instances. In general, a HIPAA standard, requirement, or implementation 
specification that is contrary to a provision of state law preempts the state law.152 
However, a contrary state law may not be preempted if the DHHS Secretary 
determines that the state law is necessary: “(1) [t]o prevent fraud and abuse related to 
the provision of or payment of health care; (2) [t]o ensure appropriate State 
regulation of insurance and health plans to the extent expressly authorized by statute 
or regulation; (3) [f]or State reporting on health care delivery or costs; or (4) for 
purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or 
welfare . . . "153 Additionally, an inconsistent state statute may not be preempted if 
the DHHS Secretary determines that its principal purpose is the “regulation of the 
manufacture, registration, distribution, dispensing, or other control of any controlled 
substances,” or that a “controlled substance by state law.”154  
HIPAA’s most unique preemption provision says that a state law relating to the 
privacy of individually identifiable health information that is more stringent than a 
HIPAA standard, requirement, or implementation specification will not be 
preempted.155 The regulation provides minimal guidance for state laws relating to the 
privacy of health information. Thus, each state law must be independently examined, 
and those that are more protective are not preempted.156 Generally, state laws 
regarding covered entities are almost always more stringent.157 Under HIPAA, a state 
law is more stringent if: 
(1) the state law prohibits or further limits the use or disclosure of 
protected health information; (2) the state law permits individuals with 
greater rights of access to or amendment of their individually identifiable 
                                                          
 149 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  The Supremacy Clause provides:  
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance Thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges 
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.   
Id. (emphasis added). 
 150 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 882 (2000). 
 151 See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987). 
 152 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2010). 
 153 Id. §160.203(a)(1). 
 154 Id. § 160.203(a)(2). 
 155 See id. § 160.203(b). 
 156 See Jennifer Guthrie, Time Is Running Out- The Burdens and Challenges of HIPAA 
Compliance: A Look at Preemption Analysis, the “Minimum Necessary” Standard, and the 
Notice of Privacy Practices, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 143, 150 (2003). 
 157 See Leyva & Leyva, supra note 110, at 14. 
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health information; (3) the state law provides for more information to be 
disseminated to the individual regarding use and disclosure of their 
protected health information; (4) the state law imposes stricter standards 
for record keeping or accounting of disclosures; or (5) the state law 
strengthens privacy protections for individuals with respect to any other 
matter.158 
Under this regulatory scheme, Ohio has sufficient room to enact legislation to 
protect its residents from medical identity theft. Regrettably, the state has explicitly 
opted to leave privacy issues related to healthcare providers to the federal 
government. 
IV.  OHIO’S DATA BREACH LAW DOES NOT COVER HIPAA COVERED ENTITIES 
Ohio, like many other states,159 has enacted laws regarding data breach 
notification. Ohio’s law covers breaches of security systems that house personal 
information.160 While Ohio’s law does cover Ohio governmental agencies, 
individuals, and entities that conduct business161 in Ohio, it does not regulate 
healthcare providers.162 Specifically, Ohio’s data breach notification laws do not 
apply to any HIPAA-covered entity.163 
Ohio’s statute is limited to protecting general personal information, such as an 
individual’s name, in combination with and linked to the individual’s social security 
number, drivers license number, or account, credit or debit card number with an 
                                                          
 158 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2010). 
 159 Just about every state has adopted some form of data encryption and regulation law.  
“As a result, all businesses should understand fully the importance of these new legal 
requirements…” Michael D. Stovsky, New Data Encryption Laws and Regulations Require 
Compliance, Ulmer Berne, LLP Client Alert (February 2009), 
http://ulmer.com/articlesalerts/clientalerts/Documents/02%20February%20-
%20Data%20Encryption.pdf. Businesses should take steps to comply with these laws because 
the “laws or regulations apply directly, or because the concepts contained in these new laws or 
regulations will likely become applicable in one form or another.” Id. 
 160 OHIO. REV. CODE. ANN. § 1349.19(A)(1)(1) (LexisNexis 2010). Ohio defines a breach 
of the security system as, “unauthorized access to and acquisition of computerized data that 
compromises the security or confidentiality of personal information owned or licensed by a 
person and that causes, reasonably is believed to have caused, or reasonably is believed will 
cause a material risk of identity theft or other fraud to the person or property of a resident of 
this state.” Id. 
 161 Jeffrey L. Kapp, et al., Data Protection and Privacy: Ohio Enacts Security Breach 
Notification Law, Jones Day (February 2006), 
http://www.jonesday.com/newsknowledge/publicationdetail.aspx?publication=3129. The 
concept of “conducting business” is not clearly defined in the notification law and it appears 
that physical presence in Ohio is not required. Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 1349.19(F)(2) (LexisNexis 2010). “This section does not 
apply to any person or entity that is a covered entity as defined in 45 C.F.R. 160.103 . . . .” Id. 
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access code that would permit access to an individual’s financial account.164 In fact, 
the statute does not even mention health related information.  
The law applies to “any person165 who owns or licenses computerized data that 
includes personal information.”166 Because most businesses store customer 
information in electronic form, virtually every business falls under this statute, 
unless it is otherwise exempted, such as HIPAA covered entities. The statute 
requires businesses to notify Ohio residents of data breaches under certain 
conditions: 
(1) When a business discovers or is notified of a breach to its information 
system; (2) The business knows or reasonably believes that an Ohio 
resident’s personal information was accessed and acquired by an 
unauthorized person; and (3) The business believes that the access and 
acquisition of the Ohio resident’s information creates a material risk of 
identity theft or other fraud.167 
Ohio requires that the notification be given within 45 days after the discovery of 
the breach.168 This notification can be done by letter, e-mail,169 or phone.170 
In the event that a business or individual violates any of Ohio’s data breach 
notification requirements, it may be subject to civil liability.171 Ohio’s attorney 
general has the “exclusive” authority to bring civil actions against companies that 
violate Ohio’s data breach notification laws.172 The statute authorizes the attorney 
general to seek temporary restraining orders, preliminary or permanent injunctions, 
                                                          
 164 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 1349.19(A)(7)(a) (LexisNexis 2010). The language of the 
statute does indicates that if the personal information is encrypted, redacted, or altered in a 
method that makes it unreadable, the personal information does not fall under the statute. Id. 
Encryption means to transform data into a form that has a low probability of assigning 
meaning without use of a confidential process or key. Id. § 1349.19(A)(4). Redaction means 
to alter the information so that no more than the last four digits of a social security number, 
driver’s license number, state identification card number, account number, or credit or debit 
card number is accessible as part of the data. Id. § 1349.19(A)(8). 
 165 Person includes both natural persons and business entities conducting business in Ohio. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19(A)(6). 
 166 Id. § 1349.19(B)(1). 
 167 See id.   
 168 See id. § 1349.19(B)(2). 
 169 Electronic notice is only appropriate when the person’s primary method of 
communication with the Ohio resident is through electronic means. See id. § 1349.19(E)(2). 
 170 Id. §1349.19(E). Substitute forms of notice are available if the company can show that it 
does not have sufficient customer contact information or that the cost of notification would 
exceed $250,000 or if the number of customers exceeds 500,000. If one of these requirements 
are met, a company may notify consumers of the breach by e-mail, posting on the customer’s 
website, or through a major media outlet that reaches at least 75% of Ohio residents. Id. 
 171 See id. § 1349.19(I). 
 172 See id. § 1349.192(A)(1). 
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and civil penalties.173  The attorney general has the exclusive authority to bring a 
civil action and may do so “based on complaints or the attorney general’s own 
inquiries.”174 Penalties that are received as a result of the attorney general’s actions 
are deposited into a consumer protection enforcement fund; however, the money is 
never given directly to the consumers.175 “The money in the consumer protection 
enforcement fund [is] used for the sole purpose of paying expenses incurred by the 
consumer protection section of the office of the attorney general.”176 
Because Ohio has expressly decided not to enact legislation to further protect the 
privacy of individual’s health information, it adds nothing to the national effort to 
prevent medical identity theft.  
V.  OHIO SHOULD AMEND ITS DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAW  
As shown above, Ohio has the authority and the ability to enact state legislation 
to help prevent medical identity theft. Specifically, there are four things that the state 
legislature can do to help prevent medical identity theft and provide its citizens relief 
when the crime occurs. First, the state should amend its data breach notification law 
to include HIPAA covered entities. Second, the state should require healthcare 
providers to notify consumers every time their information systems have been 
breached. Third, healthcare providers should be required to destroy medical records 
and other data containing patient health information when the provider wishes to 
discard the information. And finally, Ohio should provide a mechanism for 
individuals to gain direct access to monetary awards received from healthcare 
providers that violate the statute’s requirement. All of these changes will be 
proactive steps in helping to prevent medical identity theft from occurring. 
A.  Ohio’s Data Breach Notification Law Should Apply to HIPAA Covered Entities  
Ohio should amend its data breach notification statute to reach HIPAA covered 
entities. As stated earlier, HIPAA does not preempt state laws that impose more 
stringent requirements on covered entities. This allows states to protect their citizens 
better. Ohio should take advantage of this authority for two reasons. The first reason 
is that HIPAA has not been widely enforced. The second reason is that the attorney 
general can bring suits under Ohio’s law and not be subject to intervention by the 
DHHS Secretary. 
Ohio law should cover healthcare entities because HIPAA has been poorly 
enforced.177 The Office for Civil Rights178 reported that since the compliance date in 
                                                          
 173 See id. The civil penalty under this section is only levied after the attorney general has 
learned that the business “has intentionally or recklessly failed to comply with the applicable 
section for more than ninety days.” Id. § 1349.192(A)(1)(c).  After a court finds this, the 
business may be fined up to $1,000 per day for the first 60 days of noncompliance, up to 
$5,000 from day 61 to 90, and up to $10,000 for each day thereafter. Id. 
 174 Id. § 1349.191(B).  
 175 Id. § 1349.192(A)(2). 
 176 Id. § 1345.51. 
 177 California was the first state to require data breach notification and its law explicitly 
addresses health care organizations. See Hamilton, supra note 40, at 30. 
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April 2003, more than half of the cases were closed because they were not eligible 
for enforcement.179 In Ohio alone, since 2003, 71% of all complaints were resolved 
after intake and review,180 meaning that no formal investigation was ever made 
before the complaint was dismissed.181 Of Ohio cases, 11% were found not to have a 
violation after an investigation.182 And 17% of the cases were investigated and 
resolved with a voluntary corrective action or other agreement obtained from the 
covered entity.183 This is absurd considering that a recent survey found that one in 
four of the 196 health organizations that responded “do not conduct a formal risk 
analysis to identify security gaps in electronic patient data.”184 This is significant 
because a failure to conduct risk analysis is a direct violation of HIPAA’s Security 
Rule.185 Even more alarming, the survey revealed that the Department of Health and 
Human Services has never penalized an organization for violating HIPAA’s data risk 
analysis provision.186 By the Department of Health and Humans Service’s own 
admission, there is no desire to penalize healthcare providers for these violations. As 
Susan McAndrew, Deputy Director at the Department of Health and Human 
Services Office for Civil Rights, said, “[T]he Agency hasn’t issued any fines because 
the goal of enforcement is to nudge doctors, hospitals, and insurers into compliance, 
not to punish them.”187 She also added that the Department of Health and Human 
Services has no need “to evoke a penalty scheme in order to get the corrective 
action.”188 
Ohio should also amend its current data breach notification law to include 
healthcare providers because it will make enforcement of privacy and security 
                                                          
 178 “[T]he agency relies on media reports, complaints, and referrals from other agencies to 
learn of potential HIPAA rules violations.”  Joe Eaton, Patient Data Safety Rules Widely 
Disregarded, Unenforced (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.publicintegrity.org/articles/entry/1906/. 
 179 See Nicastro, supra note 123. 
 180 The resolution after intake and review can be accomplished in four ways: (1) the 
violation did not occur after April 14, 2003; (2) the entity is not covered by the Privacy Rule; 
(3) the complaint was not filed within 180 days and an extension was not granted; and (4) the 
incident described in the complaint does not violate the Privacy Rule. U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services, Enforcement Process, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/process/index.html. 
 181 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Enforcement Results by State, Dec. 31, 
2009, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/data/nmtosc.html#OH. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id.; see also U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Enforcement Process, 
supra note 180. 
 184 Eaton, supra note 178. The study came to the conclusion that a “number of hospitals, 
health clinics, and insurance firms are violating federal security rules on patient data and 
putting sensitive health information at risk.” Id. 
 185 See 45 C.F.R. 164.308(a)(1) (2010). The purpose of the risk assessment is to assure that 
patient information does not fall into the wrong hands. See generally id. 
 186 See Eaton, supra note 178.  
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
2010] OHIO’S “AGGRESSIVE” ATTACK 135 
 
standards easier. Under HIPAA, when a state attorney general seeks to punish a 
covered entity for violating one of the statute’s requirements, the attorney general 
must first notify the DHHS Secretary, who may intervene in the action.189 If Ohio 
were to apply its data breach notification statute directly to HIPAA covered entities, 
the attorney general could bypass any possible intervention by the DHHS Secretary 
and file civil suits based on violations of the Ohio statute.190  
Applying Ohio law to covered entities provides a better way of enforcing data 
breach notification law and makes HIPAA’s lack of enforcement virtually irrelevant 
because of the adequacy of the state law.191 State laws that make enforcement of a 
federal law virtually irrelevant are not unprecedented. In fact, in areas beyond data 
breach there are many examples of state regulations being more effective than 
federal regulations.192 For example, Congress has delegated the entire regulation and 
taxation of the insurance industry to the states.193 Furthermore, “one of federalism’s 
chief virtues . . . is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that ‘a 
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
                                                          
 189 See HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13410(e)(1), 123 Stat. 115, 274 (2009). 
 190 In other regulatory schemes, federal regulation agencies do not have the power to 
intervene. For example, in the field of environmental regulation, while notice is given, the 
Environmental Protection Agency cannot intervene in an action. See 40 C.F.R. § 254.2. The 
regulation provides no indication that the Environmental Protection Agency can intervene in a 
civil action brought by a citizen or state attorney general. For example, the regulation states, 
“[A] copy of the notice shall be mailed to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
Agency, The Regional Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency for the region 
in which the violation is alleged to have occurred, and the chief administrative officer of the 
solid waste management agency for the State in which the violation is alleged to have 
occurred” Id. § 254.2(a)(1). 
 191 There is a school of thought that feels that a federal law addressing data breach is 
unnecessary because state laws are adequate. See Samuel Lee, Breach Notification Laws: 
Notification Requirements and Data Safeguarding Now Apply to Everyone, Including 
Entrepreneurs, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J. 125, 142 (2006). 
 192 Examining the Financial Services Industry’s Responsibilities and Role in Preventing 
Identity Theft and Protecting Sensitive Financial Information: Before the S. Comm. On 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 728 (2005) (Statement of Edmund 
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group). A few 
examples of state privacy leadership: 
• “[F]orty states had already enacted ‘do not call lists’ before the Federal Trade 
Commission acted in 2003 to establish a national list. 
• Seven states enacted free credit report on request laws before Congress enacted 
one in the 2003 [Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act]. 
• Over a dozen states enacted laws requiring the truncation of credit card 
numbers on consumer receipts before the provision was made nationwide in the 
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act.”  
Id. 
 193 See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2008). The Act provides that the 
“business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the 
several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.” Id. § 1012(a). 
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novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’”194 It 
is under this backdrop that Ohio should take the first step and mandate that its data 
breach notification apply to healthcare providers. 
If Ohio were to amend its data breach notification law to reach HIPAA covered 
entities, there are concerns that amending the state law would be unproductive. 
Opponents to the amendment may argue that the federal law, HIPAA, should 
completely preempt state data breach notification laws.195 The conclusion reached by 
this school of thought is that data security is a “distinct federal responsibility that 
requires a targeted federal legislative and regulatory response.”196 This school of 
thought argues that the federal government should control this because notification 
requirements differ from state to state and not all states provide protections to 
organizations that try to protect personal information through encryption.197 
Additional support for this position is that a central regulatory authority enforcing a 
single law is much better than various state attorneys general enforcing their own 
state laws because of the difficulty in understanding which conflicting law controls 
in a given situation.198  
Supporters of a single federal act that would preempt all state laws on the subject 
note that one central federal regulatory system would better address the needs of the 
consumers and HIPAA covered entities. The argument is that state laws are too 
consumer based because the laws require disclosure based on the residency of the 
                                                          
 194 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Conner, J., dissenting) (quoting New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). 
 195 See Lee, supra note 191, at 142. 
 196 See Examining the Financial Services Industry’s Responsibilities and Role in 
Preventing Identity Theft and Protecting Sensitive Financial Information: Before the S. 
Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 728 (2005) (Statement of Ira D. 
Hammerman, Senior Vice President and General Counsel to the Securities Industry 
Association).  Ira D. Hammerman urged the Senate to adopt the following assertions in 
establishing a national data breach notification law that would preempt all state laws: 
1. “A clear national standard to achieve a uniform, consistent approach that meets 
consumer expectation; 
2. Trigger for consumer notice tied to significant risk of harm or injury that might 
result in identity theft;   
3. A precise definition of sensitive personal information tied to the risk of identity 
theft;  
4. Exclusive functional regulator oversight and rulemaking authority; 
5. Flexible notification provisions; and 
6. Reasonable administrative compliance obligations.”   
Id. 
 197 See Jaikumar Vijayan, Three More States Add Laws on Data Breaches, Computerworld 
(Jan. 6, 2006), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/107574/Three_More_States_Add_Laws_on_Data_B
reaches. 
 198 See id. The difference in state laws is likely to exacerbate the confusion and potential 
harm to customers. See Mierzwinski, supra note 192. 
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consumer, rather than the location where the breach occurred. This means that when 
a covered entity incurs a data breach, it must comply with the state law of each of its 
affected consumers.199 This could easily range from a few different state laws to 
dozens of state laws depending on the size of the covered entity’s personal 
information database. In essence, supporters of a single federal law support a central 
regulatory and enforcement body because it would have the expertise to adjust 
privacy protections over time as threat levels change and the industry’s ability to 
respond to data breaches evolves.200 
Finally, supporters of one national law argue that because evidence is lacking on 
the effectiveness of data breach notification statutes in preventing general identity 
theft,201 extension of Ohio’s law to covered entities may not decrease instances of 
medical identity theft. A study showed that the passage of data breach notification 
laws reduced the identity theft rate by less than 6.1 percent on average.202 Healthcare 
providers and the legislature fear that extending Ohio’s law to covered entities may 
not effectively prevent cases of medical identity theft, but rather impede e-commerce 
and stifle technological development by discouraging healthcare providers from 
innovation using consumers’ personal health information.203  
The concerns of those desiring a national regulatory scheme are outweighed for 
the reasons stated earlier. Additionally, breach notification statutes provide “an 
incentive for companies to improve security controls and [allow] consumers to make 
informed decisions about their individually identifiable information.”204 
Furthermore, there is no telling how effective the HIPAA amendments through the 
HITECH Act will be. It is too soon to tell if the new data breach notification laws 
                                                          
 199 See Romanosky et. al., supra note 23, at 7. 
 200 See Mierzwinski, supra note 192.  
 201 See Romanosky et. al., supra note 21, at 3. “To date, no empirical analysis has 
investigated the effectiveness of such legislative initiatives in reducing identity theft.” Id. at 3.  
 202 Id. at 2. By the study’s own admission, the quality of data and the possibility of 
sampling bias also potentially affected the information. See id. However, the argument gains 
support through comparison to other laws enacted to combat certain behavior. For example, 
state laws banning the use of handheld devices to make calls or send text messages while 
driving have not resulted in fewer vehicle crashes, despite the fact that six states and the 
District of Columbia ban talking on a hand-held device, and 19 states and the District of 
Columbia ban texting while driving. See generally Distracted Driving Laws Don’t Stop 
Crashes, Study Shows, Associated Press, Jan. 29, 2010, available at 
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2010/01/distracted_driving_laws_dont_s.html. 
The article concludes that the survey leaves more questions than answers because the data did 
not definitively determine why the laws have not decreased the number of accidents. Id. Much 
like the purpose of data breach notification statutes, these bans are designed to prevent an 
event from occurring other than the subject matter that the law directly addresses. These bans 
on activities while driving are designed to prevent accidents, and the data breach regulations 
are designed to prevent occurrences of identity theft. Comparing the results of legislation in 
both areas will be helpful in determining their overall effectiveness.  
 203 Romanosky et. al., supra note 23, at 2. 
 204 Hamilton, supra note 40, at 31; Romanosky et. al., supra note 23, at 2. “Notifications 
can also enable law enforcement, researchers, and policy makers to better understand which 
firms and sectors are best [or worst] at protecting consumer and employee data.” Romanosky 
et. al., supra note 23, at 2. 
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will be enforced any differently than the existing HIPAA requirements. Industry 
commentators have observed, “[W]ith so little proactive intervention by the federal 
government to date, covered entities have no incentive to take the threat of civil or 
criminal penalties [introduced through the HITECH Act] seriously.”205 Moreover, 
even if the state laws provide only an ounce of incentive to prevent medical identity 
theft from occurring, it is worth a pound of cure.206 
B.  Ohio’s Data Breach Notification Law Should Have an Acquisition-Based Trigger 
Ohio should amend its data breach notification statute by replacing its risk-based 
trigger with an acquisition-based trigger. State data breach notification laws can be 
defined by their trigger. The trigger is the event that requires the organization to 
notify its customers that a data breach occurred.207 States differ on the event that 
triggers organizations to notify consumers of a data breach.208 There are two types of 
triggers: acquisition-based triggers and risk-based triggers. Acquisition-based 
triggers require consumer notification whenever personal data is reasonably believed 
to have been acquired by an unauthorized person and require no evidence that an 
unauthorized person actually acquired the data.209 On the other hand, “[r]isk-based 
triggers allow for a risk assessment to determine whether any harm has or will be 
done to those whose records were potentially breached.”210 With risk-based triggers, 
notification is only necessary where the potential for harm exists.211 
Ohio should adopt an acquisition-based trigger like California’s statute because 
an acquisition-based trigger puts consumers on notice that an unauthorized 
individual has accessed their personal information. This is the better model for 
consumers because under the risk-based trigger, consumers are not notified when an 
organization cannot determine who accessed consumer information and why.212 In 
other words, under the risk-based trigger, a business whose security has been 
breached has no duty to notify consumers if it does not know how the information is, 
                                                          
 205 Tobi M. Murphy, Comment: Enforcement of the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Moving From 
Illusory Voluntary Compliance to Continuous Compliance Through Private Accreditation, 54 
LOY. L. REV. 155, 182 (2008). 
 206 See David Harlow, HIPAA Enforcement by State Attorneys General: The Shape of 
Things to Come (Jan. 14, 2010), http://healthblawg.typepad.com/healthblawg/2010/01/hipaa-
enforcement-by-state-attorneys-general-the-shape-of-things-to-come.html. 
 207 Julie A. Heitzenrater, Identity and Data Loss: Data Breach Notification Legislation: 
Recent Developments, 4 I/S: A J.L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 661, 663 (2009). 
 208 Michael E. Jones, Privacy on the Internet and in Organizational Database: Data 
Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private Sectors, 3 I/S: A J. L. & POL’Y FOR 
THE INFO. SOC’Y 555, 561-62 (2007). 
 209 Heitzenrater, supra note 207, at 663-64. This type of trigger is used in about half the 
states that have data breach notification statutes. Jones, supra note 208, at 562. 
 210 Heitzenrater, supra note 207, at 664. 
 211 Id.  
 212 Examining the Financial Services Industry’s Responsibilities and Role in Preventing 
Identity Theft and Protecting Sensitive Financial Information: Before the S. Comm. On 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, supra note 192 (Statement of Edmund Mierzwinski, 
Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group). 
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or might be used by an unauthorized user.213 This leaves the burden of uncertainty on 
consumers, by virtually leaving them in the dark.214 This burden can be extremely 
severe as it pertains to medical identity theft because unlike regular identity theft, 
there is no guarantee that the consumer will even find out about the medical identity 
theft. Even if the consumer finds out about it, there is no central repository of 
information where the consumer can call and get matter corrected. Additionally, 
risk-based triggers are not useful in preventing medical identity theft because they 
allow companies, which have an interest in keeping data breaches secret, to decide if 
notice is required.215 The acquisition-based trigger provides an incentive for 
businesses to invest more in data security because they know they are obligated to 
notify consumers of every data breach.216 
The opposition to acquisition-based triggers argues that too much reporting will 
lead to consumer apathy about the risk of medical identity theft.217 The purpose is to 
ensure that notification is always linked to some sort of demonstrable risk of harm to 
the customer.218 Furthermore, the risk-based trigger considers the interests of the 
businesses responsible for notification219 because it allows the organization to 
consider the cost of breach notification and the actual likelihood that the breached 
information will be used to harm the individual. An acquisition-based trigger would 
increase overhead costs because healthcare providers would be forced to notify the 
public any time a data breach occurred.  
                                                          
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 10. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. This allows companies to unilaterally issue notifications whenever they feel 
disclosure is appropriate. Id. 
 218 Examining the Financial Services Industry’s Responsibilities and Role in Preventing 
Identity Theft and Protecting Sensitive Financial Information: Before the S. Comm. On 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, supra note 192 (Statement of Ira D. Hammerman, 
Senior V.P. and Gen. Counsel, Sec. Indus. Ass’n.).  
 219 It is yet to be seen how the United States Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission will play out in the area of healthcare legislation. See generally 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). It is very possible that 
healthcare lobbyists will be able to persuade legislators, at the federal and state level, for more 
favorable laws and regulations. See generally The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N. Y. TIMES 
EDITORIAL (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/opinion/22fri1.html.  
Healthcare lobbyists may be able to persuade legislators like never before because the 
decision in Citizens United struck down decades-old limitations on corporate political 
expenditures by permitting businesses and unions to spend freely on commercials for or 
against candidates. See Jess Bravin, Court Kills Limits on Corporate Politicking, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 22, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703699204575016942930090152.html.  
President Obama called the decision, “[a] major victory for big oil, Wall Street banks, Health 
insurance companies and other powerful interests that marshal their power every day in 
Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans.” Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, 
Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22scotus.html (emphasis added).  
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While these concerns to the corporate welfare are important, they fail to address 
the fact that corporations have a duty to protect the consumer information that they 
possess. Based on the number of data breaches occurring every year, it is undisputed 
that healthcare providers and other organizations are simply incapable of protecting 
information. This inability puts patients and consumers at risk. At the very least, 
healthcare providers should be required to inform patients when information systems 
are breached. Additionally, the term “risk-based trigger” is somewhat of an 
oxymoron because corporations are incapable of truly determining when and how an 
unauthorized user of consumer information is going to do with that information. It is 
very common for a hacker to steal personal information from an organization and 
wait months or even years before attempting to use the stolen information.220 The 
bottom line is that consumers have the right to know when an organization they 
trusted has failed to safeguard their personal information. Customers also have the 
right to decide what course of action they will take to protect themselves from 
potential medical identity theft attempts. Healthcare providers and other businesses, 
which have a vested interest in not notifying customers and are incapable of 
determining what an unauthorized person will do with customers’ information, 
should not be able to take these rights away. 
C.  Ohio’s Data Breach Notification Law Should Require Healthcare Providers to 
Destroy or Encrypt Discarded Medical Records  
Ohio should amend its data breach notification statute to require covered entities 
to destroy data that the entity wants to dispose of.221 This requirement is important 
because careless document disposal is the leading way for identity thieves to get 
personal information.222 In fact, only 12% of identity theft is perpetrated online.223 
For example, a fourth-grade schoolteacher in Salt Lake City purchased scrap paper 
for her students that turned out to be medical records of twenty-eight patients.224 
Included in the records that were inadvertently sold as surplus paper were the 
medical history, personal contact information, insurance information, and social 
security numbers for each patient.225  This example is merely illustrative of the vast 
                                                          
 220 Darrow & Lichtenstein, supra, note 20, at 25. 
 221 Ohio’s statute establishes a safe harbor for information that is encrypted. See OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1349.19(A)(7)(a) (LexisNexis 2010).  No state requires corporations to provide 
notification of a data breach if the compromised information is encrypted. See Bruce E. H. 
Johnson et al., Data Breach Notice Legislation: New Technologies and New Privacy Duties?, 
865 PLI/PAT 203, 216 (2006). This creates a safe harbor for corporations to avoid data breach 
notification requirements by encrypting all electronic consumer information. Id. 
 222 Lisa Black & John Keilman. Paper Trail: Personal Data Found Blowing in the Wind 
(Jan. 30, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-01-30/news/1001300085_1_social-
security-documents-paperwork/2; see also Better Business Bureau, Spring-Cleaning? Prevent 
ID Theft by Following BBB Advice on What to Keep and What to Shred, (Apr. 2, 2008), 
http://www.bbb.org/us/article/spring-cleaning-prevent-id-theft-by-following-bbb-advice-on-
what-to-keep-and-what-to-shred-4149. 
 223 See Better Business Bureau, supra note 222. 
 224 See Medical Records Sold to Teacher as Scrap Paper, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 10, 2008), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23561667/?GT1=43001. 
 225 Id. 
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majority of identity theft cases that occur when the thief has direct contact with the 
victim’s personal information through a stolen or lost wallet, or by rifling through 
the victim’s mailbox or trash.226 This means that an effective and proactive way to 
prevent medial identity theft even before it happens is to properly destroy data 
containing personal information when it is no longer useful.227 
Ohio should implement one of two types of data destruction laws. The first 
option is a data destruction law that specifically enumerates how the data must be 
destroyed.228 California, for example, requires businesses to destroy customers’ 
records that are no longer being maintained.229 The provision states that:  
A business shall take all reasonable steps to dispose, or arrange for the 
disposal of customer records within its custody or control containing 
personal information when the records are no longer to be retained by the 
business by shredding, erasing, or otherwise modifying the personal 
information in those records to make it unreadable or undecipherable 
through any means.230  
                                                          
 226 See id. Identity thieves often dumpster dive or look through trash for private information 
that can be harvested and used for unlawful purposes. See New York State Consumer 
Protection Board, Shred the Word! To Prevent Identity Theft at a Free Public Shredding Day 
in Amsterdam, NY (Sept. 21, 2009), 
http://www.consumer.state.ny.us/pressreleases/2009/sept212009.htm. 
 227 See generally Better Business Bureau, supra note 222. 
 228 States that have passed this type of law include Arkansas, California, Georgia, Indiana, 
Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, Texas, Vermont. See Scott & Scott LLP, Data Destruction Law (Business and 
Technology Law) (Oct. 5, 2007), 
http://blawg.scottandscottllp.com/businessandtechnologylaw/2007/10/data_destruction_laws.h
tml. 
 229 Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 230 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81 (West 2010). California is not the only state that has the 
disposal requirement. For example, Colorado’s law states: “Each public and private entity in 
the state that uses documents during the course of business that contain personal identifying 
information shall develop a policy for the destruction or proper disposal of paper documents 
containing personal identifying information.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-713(1) (2010).  
Additionally, New York has a similar provision:   
No person, business, firm, partnership, association, or corporation, not including the 
state or its political subdivisions, shall dispose of a record containing personal 
identifying information unless the person, business, firm, partnership, association, or 
corporation, or other person under contract with the business, firm, partnership, 
association, or corporation does any of the following: (a) shreds the record before the 
disposal of the record; or (b) destroys the personal identifying information contained 
in the record; or (c) modifies the record to make the personal identifying information 
unreadable; or (d) takes actions consistent with commonly accepted industry practices 
that it reasonably believes will ensure that no unauthorized person will have access to 
the personal identifying information contained in the record. Provided, however, that 
an individual person shall not be required to comply with this subdivision unless he or 
she is conducting business for profit.  
NY GEN. BUS. § 399-h (McKinney 2010). 
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The other type of data destruction simply mandates the use of a disposal system 
that meets a reasonableness standard.231 Maryland’s law, for example, states that:  
[W]hen a business is destroying a customer’s records that contain 
personal information of the customer,232 the business shall take reasonable 
steps to protect against unauthorized access to or use of the personal 
information, taking into account: (1) The sensitivity of the records; (2) 
The nature and size of the business and its operations; (3) The costs and 
benefits of different destruction methods; and (4) Available technology.233  
Regardless of which form of data destruction law the Ohio adopts, there is 
considerable value in requiring firms to destroy unwanted medical information. As 
Better Business Bureau CEO Director Michelle Corey stated, “[s]tudies show that 
most thieves obtain personal information through trash cans or unsecured places in 
the home or office, and the easiest way to protect identity is to shred personal 
documents.”234  
D.  Ohio’s Data Breach Notification Law Should Be Amended to Give Residents a 
Method of Recovering Monetary Awards Against Covered Entities That Violate 
Ohio’s Law 
Ohio’s data breach law should be amended to give citizens some mechanism to 
recover monetary awards when a business violates the law and the citizen is injured 
as a result of the violation. The mechanism to recover should be either a civil action 
brought directly by the citizen against the healthcare provider or a civil action 
brought by the attorney general entitling a citizen harmed by the statutory violation 
to a portion of the monetary penalty.235 
Ohio residents should be able to bring private lawsuits under the amended 
statute. There are a number of states that allow private causes of action under their 
data breach notification statutes.236 These civil actions provide an incentive for 
                                                          
 231 States that have adopted this form of record destruction include: Arkansas, Colorado, 
Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. See Scott & Scott 
LLP, supra note 228. 
 232 Customer means an individual residing in the State who provides personal information 
to a business for the purpose of purchasing or leasing a product or obtaining a service from the 
business. MD. CODE ANN., COM-LAW § 14-3502(a) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 233  MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW. 14-3502(b) (LexisNexis 2009). 
 234 Press Release, Ill. Att’y Gen. Lisa Madigan, Madigan Co-Sponsors “Shred Day” to 
Help Eliminate ID Theft (Mar. 29, 2006), 
http://www.ag.state.il.us/pressroom/2006_03/20060329.html. 
 235 For example, if a healthcare provider does not notify an individual that their personal 
information was accessed in a breach, and as a result of that breach the citizen’s medical 
identity is stolen, the person should be able to recover from the healthcare provider who 
violated the statute. 
 236 In the District of Columbia, “[a]ny District of Columbia resident injured by a violation 
of this subchapter may institute a civil action to recover actual damages, the costs of the 
action, and reasonable attorney's fees.” D.C. CODE § 28-3853(a) (2010). “Actual damages 
shall not include dignitary damages, including pain and suffering.” Id. In Louisiana, “[a] civil 
action may be instituted to recover actual damages resulting from the failure to disclose in a 
timely manner to a person that there has been a breach of the security system resulting in the 
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corporations to comply with data breach laws by exposing them to financial 
penalties.237 The result is that many corporations have strengthened their compliance 
programs to reduce the potential for violations.238 
As displayed in other areas of regulation, specifically environmental protection, 
civil actions are effective tools in enforcing statutory requirements. In environmental 
regulation, “no program of environmental protection is better than its enforcement 
system.”239 A primary concern of environmentally regulated entities is avoiding 
liability.240 Under the environmental regulation system, companies are potentially 
liable to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), state regulatory agencies, and 
private citizens,241 who can bring toxic tort, nuisance, or other types of actions 
against the business.242 The EPA enforcement policy, for instance, calls for penalties 
equal to the economic benefit the violator enjoyed, multiplied by a gravity 
                                                          
disclosure of a person's personal information.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 51:3075 (2010). In 
Tennessee, “[a]ny customer of an information holder who is a person or business entity, but 
who is not an agency of the state or any political subdivision of the state, and who is injured 
by a violation of this section, may institute a civil action to recover damages and to enjoin the 
person or business entity from further action in violation of this section.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 
47-18-2107(h) (2009). “The rights and remedies available under this section are cumulative to 
each other and to any other rights and remedies available under law.” Id. 
 237 See generally John S. Moot, Compliance Programs, Penalty Mitigation and the FERC, 
29 ENERGY L. J. 547 (2008). 
 238 See id.  Generally, a duty-based liability induces firms to undertake optimal policing 
measures such as monitoring, investigating, and reporting. Jennifer Arlen & Reiner 
Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 694 (1997). However, it presents weaker incentives to adopt 
preventative measures because of the difficulty of determining ex post whether the duty has 
been met. Id. at 705. 
 239 Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, 
Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 81, 82 (2002). Most regulatory agencies 
prefer to work informally with violators: bargaining with them or helping them reach 
voluntary compliance rather than punishing their noncompliance in formal administrative or 
judicial actions to deter future violations. Id. at 83. Each citizen suit is an opportunity for 
oversight of the regulatory enforcement process. Id. at 84.  
 240 See Allison F. Gardner, Beyond Compliance: Regulatory Incentives to Implement 
Environmental Management Systems, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 662, 668 (2003).  
 241 Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Section 7002, citizens are 
authorized to bring enforcement actions against potential or actual violators and against the 
Environmental Protection Agency in federal district court.  RCRA Enforcement Process and 
Authorities, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/oecaearth/civil/rcra/rcraenfprocess.html (last updated May 18, 2010). 
 242 40 C.F.R. 254.1 (2010).  “The Solid Waste Disposal Act . . . authorizes suit by any 
person to enforce the Act.” Id. These suits may be brought where there is alleged to be a 
violation by any person of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order 
which has become effective under the Act, or a failure of the Administrator to perform any act 
or duty under the Act, which is not discretionary with the Administrator. Id. These actions are 
to be filed in accordance with the rules of the district court in which the action is instituted. Id. 
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component based on the severity and blameworthiness of the violation.243  There are 
clear indicators that adversarial enforcement of environmental regulations 
discourages targeted regulated entities from violating the law.244 While cooperative 
enforcement, which eschews penalties altogether, results in a minimal material 
incentive for companies to avoid noncompliance.245 
In addition to the incentive that private lawsuits would give healthcare providers 
to comply with Ohio’s data breach notification law, Ohio residents need a cause of 
action under the amended statute because common law suits with regard to data 
breaches have been widely unsuccessful.246 Ohio, like other states, provides for 
administrative enforcement of its data security law but does not bar relevant 
common law causes of action by private citizens.247 While the statute allows for 
common law actions, it does not allow a citizen to use the statute itself as a source 
for duty or liability in civil cases.248 Many lawsuits have emerged in the last decade 
from citizens filing common law civil actions seeking damages from businesses that 
lost their personal information. While all of these suits have involved data breaches 
and regular identity theft, they provide insight into how courts will likely deal with 
future common law actions concerning medical identity theft.  
Generally, when citizens bring a lawsuit, it is under one of three causes of action: 
breach of contract, negligence, or breach of fiduciary duty.249 It has been suggested 
                                                          
 243 See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Policy on Civil Penalties (Feb. 16, 1984), available in 17 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,083 (1987). The adversarial approach’s goal is to establish a 
credible punitive response that produces specific and general deterrence through the 
systematic imposition of penalties. See Zinn, supra note 239, at 88. Imposing penalties 
eliminates the economic benefit a firm derives from noncompliance and makes 
noncompliance more expensive than compliance. See id. 
 244 See id. at 96. 
 245 See id. at 97. 
 246 See generally Key v. DSW Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Ohio 2006). The court 
determined that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue. See id.  The class action lawsuit failed 
because the court noted that any named plaintiffs, who represent a class, must allege and show 
that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by another, 
unidentified member of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent. Id. 
at 687.  The complaint failed because the plaintiff did not personally experience any injury 
other than an increased risk of identity theft or other related financial crimes. Id. at 688.  
Furthermore, the plaintiff lacked standing because the alleged injury is dependent upon the 
perceived risk of future actions of third parties that were not before the court. Id. at 689. 
 247 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.192(A)(1)(c)  (West 2010).  “The rights and remedies 
that are provided under this section are in addition to any other rights or remedies that are 
provided by law.”  REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.192(C)  (West 2010).  The first major hurdle that 
potential plaintiffs need to overcome is to show that they have standing to sue in the first 
place. To have standing a plaintiff must meet three requirements. See Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). First, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered 
an injury in fact, which is actual, concrete, and particularized. Id. Second, the plaintiff must 
show a causal connection between the conduct complained of and the injury. Id. Finally, the 
plaintiff must establish that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. 
 248 See Pinson, supra note 22, at 41. 
 249 An underlying theme that evolves from all the cases that deal with this topic is that 
injury is an extremely difficult element to prove. Often times, plaintiffs advance the cost of 
 
2010] OHIO’S “AGGRESSIVE” ATTACK 145 
 
that the breach of contract is the best basis to bring a data breach claim; however, 
this cause of action almost always leaves victims with little or no recourse.250 This is 
because it is difficult, if not impossible to discover, let alone prove with a legal 
certainty, which organization was responsible for losing the personal information 
that caused the identity theft.251 Additionally, compensable damages are an element 
of a breach of contract cause of action and these can also be very difficult to 
establish in an identity theft context.252 
Citizens seeking recovery under a negligence theory are also unlikely to receive 
favorable rulings. In a negligence action, a plaintiff must prove the following 
elements to recover damages: (1) existence of a legal duty; (2) breach of that duty; 
(3) causation of harm due to the breach; and (4) resulting damages.253 The biggest 
hurdle in making a prima facie case for negligence is proving that the individual has 
been harmed. Courts have held that time spent correcting a case of identity theft, the 
increased threat of identity theft,254 and the cost of credit monitoring systems255 are 
not compensable injuries. Causation may also be equally difficult to prove.256 
                                                          
credit monitoring as an injury. They also assert that the cost of future monitoring is an injury 
that deserves compensation. Courts often reject these arguments by comparing future health 
monitoring in the toxic tort context and future financial health monitoring in the data breach 
context. For example, in Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, the court noted that 
future health monitoring is as sufficient injury because it necessarily and directly involves 
human health and safety and credit monitoring cases do not. Stollenwerk v. Tri-West 
Healthcare Alliance, 2005 WL 2465906, at 4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2005). It is this public health 
interest that justifies departure from the general rule that enhanced future risk of injury cannot 
form the sole basis for a negligence action. See Amfrac Distrib. Corp. v Miller, 673 P.2d 792, 
793-94 (Ariz. 1983). As a side note, courts may consider an exception with regard to the 
effects of medical identity theft; however, this theory is untested in the medical identity theft 
context. 
 250 Darrow & Lichtenstein, supra note 20, at 28. 
 251 See Kathryn E. Picanso, Protecting Information Security under a Uniform Data Breach 
Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 377 (2006); see also Bell v. Acxiom Corp., 2006 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 72477 *10 (E. D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006) (plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed 
because the plaintiff did not know whether her name and information was contained within 
the databases stolen). 
 252 See McCalment v. Eli Lilly & Co., 860 N.E. 2d 884, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).  For 
example, in Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp, the plaintiffs could not recover on their breach 
of contract claim because of their failure to establish compensable damages. See Pisciotta v. 
Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 639-40 (7th Cir. 2007). The court noted that without more 
than allegations of increased risk of future identity theft, the plaintiffs had not suffered a harm 
that the law was prepared to remedy. Id. at 639. 
 253 Nye v. CSX Transp., Inc., 437 F.3d 556, 563 (6th Cir. 2006). The threat of future harm, 
not yet realized, will not satisfy the damage requirement. Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. 
Corp., 2006 WL 288483 at 5 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006). The defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment was granted in the case because the plaintiff failed to show that he himself was 
victim of identity theft or some other fraud. Id. at 5-6. The court held that the negligence 
action could not be sustained. Id. 
 254 In the identity theft context, courts have embraced the general rule that an alleged 
increase in risk of future injury is not an actual or imminent injury. Consequently, courts have 
held that plaintiffs lack standing, or have granted summary judgment for failure to establish 
damages in cases involving identity theft or claims of negligence and breach of confidentiality 
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Breach of fiduciary duty has not provided a viable cause of action for victims 
either. For a breach of fiduciary duty claim to be effective, the victim must prove 
that entrusting the data collector with personal information creates a quasi-fiduciary 
relationship that is more similar to an agency relationship than to an arm’s length 
relationship.257 As a fiduciary, it could be argued that the data collector assumed the 
duty to act for the benefit of the consumer with respect to matters within the scope of 
the relationship.258 This duty includes the duties of loyalty, trust, and 
confidentiality.259 This cause of action is largely untested and there is room for 
further consideration.260 However, when the cause of action is used, the plaintiff still 
must establish an injury, which, as already discussed, can be extremely difficult.261 
While is it clear that most common law civil actions with regard to data breach 
fail because the plaintiff cannot prove damages, there will be cases where the 
plaintiff is a victim of medical identity theft and can prove damages. When a suit 
like this arises, rather than leaving the damages award up to a jury based on a 
common law action, the more reasonable approach would be to allow individual 
citizens to sue under the Ohio data breach notification statute. Like California’s 
statute,262 Ohio’s statute could set the monetary penalties to be awarded to a plaintiff 
                                                          
brought in response to a third party theft or unlawful access to financial information from a 
financial institution. Key, 454 F. Supp. 2d, at 689; see Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., 2006 U.S. 
Dist. Lexis 52266 at 1 (D. N.J. July 31, 2006). 
 255 The cost of measures to avoid identity theft fraud, courts typically have found these 
efforts not to be harms themselves, but merely voluntary actions taken in anticipation of 
potential harm. James Graves, “Medical” Monitoring for Non-medical Harms: Evaluating the 
Reasonable Necessity of Measurers to Avoid Identity Fraud After a Data Breach, 16 RICH. 
J.L. & TECH. 2, 8 (2009). In other contexts medical monitoring damages allow recovery of 
costs of medical tests designed to detect and prevent the onset of diseases resulting from the 
defendant’s actions. Id. at 12. Plaintiffs have sought damages for the cost of monitoring the 
long-term effects of physical injuries, pharmaceuticals, tobacco, insecticides, asbestos, and 
other harmful substances. Id. Courts are reluctant to extend this judicial principal to non-
physical injuries. Id. at 27. 
 256 One court noted that as a requirement to a negligence action, the plaintiff must show 
that there is evidence that the thieves or other unauthorized individuals were able to access the 
information or if accessed that it would be used for unlawful purposes. See Kahle v. Litton 
Loan Servicing LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712-13 (S. D. Ohio 2007).  This shows that the 
plaintiff must know, and prove legal certainty, which organization lost the information and the 
unlawful purposes the information was in.  See id. 
 257 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006). 
 258 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1979). 
 259 See id. 
 260 See generally Brandon Faulkner, Hacking into Data Breach Notification Laws, 59 FLA. 
L. REV. 1097, 1122 (2007).  
 261 Shafran v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22494, 8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 
2008) (plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty among other causes of action failed for failure to 
show damages). 
 262 In California, a private citizen can file suit “for a willful, intentional, or reckless 
violation” of California’s data breach statute and recover a civil penalty up to $3,000 per 
violation. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(c) (West 2009). The citizen may also sue to enjoin 
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who brings a successful action. Lawsuits under the statute are the best for both 
parties. Healthcare providers are protected because a victim must still have standing 
to bring suit and the maximum potential award the provider would be responsible for 
is already set. Consumers are protected because they would have direct access to 
monetary recovery from a healthcare provider and the statute provides the standard 
of care to show that the healthcare provider acted either negligently or willfully. 
Even if Ohio does not allow for private civil actions under the statute, it should 
allow Ohio residents to access the awards earned by the Ohio Attorney General 
through suits brought under the Ohio amended data breach notification law and 
HIPAA. Under Ohio’s current law, the attorney general has the exclusive authority 
to bring a civil action in a court of common pleas.263 Even though an individual may 
have filed the complaint with the Ohio attorney general that provided the basis to file 
suit, the current statute does not provide that individual access to the civil award. 
Ohio should adopt a policy similar to the plan articulated in the HITECH Act,264 
where citizens receive a portion of the penalties received as a result of their 
complaint to the attorney general. This access to attorney general monetary 
recoveries is important because it is extremely difficult for an individual citizen to 
bring a successful private action. Additionally, some financial injuries to certain 
medical identity theft victims may be so small that the cost of a lawsuit may make 
litigation unfavorable. When the attorney general files lawsuits on behalf of similarly 
situated individuals, those individuals should have direct access to the awards to 
compensate for their injuries, no matter how small. After all, the role of the Ohio 
Attorney General is not to make money exclusively for his own office. His role is to 
“protect Ohio families from predatory financial practices through [its] enforcement 
authority in the areas of consumer protection, antitrust, charitable organizations, and 
health care fraud.”265 
Amending the statute to allow Ohio residents access to monetary recovery does 
raise concerns about the effect it will have on healthcare providers. These entities 
already spend money on data breach prevention and data breach remediation. The 
remediation costs include printing and postage of notification letters, hiring a law 
firm to address legal issues, offering credit monitoring subscriptions to customers, 
                                                          
any business that violates or proposes to violate the statute. See id. § 1798.84(e).  When the 
citizen wins the lawsuit, he is entitled to recover his or her reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs. See id. § 1798.84(g). 
 263 See Richard Cordray, Security Breaches and Compromise of Personal Information For 
Ohio Businesses, OHIO ATT’Y GEN. (2009), 
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/files/Publications/Publications-for-Victims/Identity-
Theft-Information/Business-Breach. If it appears that a person has failed or is failing to 
comply with the Act’s requirements, a court, upon a finding of such failure, should impose a 
civil penalty of a specified amount per day for each day the person fails to comply with the 
Act. Id 
 264 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13410(a), 123 
Stat. 115 (2009). 
 265 OHIO ATTORNEY GEN., About the Ohio Attorney General, OHIO ATT’Y GEN., 
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/getattachment/aa8e59f3-6ecc-485f-b8fe-
a344821d06a5/About-the-AG-Brochure.aspx (last visited February 16, 2010) (emphasis 
added). 
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customer defections,266 and implementing a customer support hotline.267  Healthcare 
providers may argue that being subjected to additional litigation imposes too much 
of a cost. However, the purpose of data breach notification statutes is to increase the 
standards of data security and ensure notice to the public when these systems are 
breached. Litigation simply sheds light on contested administrative practices and 
decisions, bringing such practices to the attention of legislative oversight.268 
In opposition to further consumer access to monetary penalties for statutory 
violations, companies also offer an alternative to adversarial enforcement. The 
alternative is that firms may use self-regulated notifications as a market 
differentiator.269 In other words, if data breach notification is important to 
consumers, the market will respond accordingly favoring firms with stricter 
notification policies.270 As an alternative, voluntary compliance can be very effective 
with providers who are motivated to establish adequate data breach systems because 
this strategy seeks to avoid conflict and reduces the cost associated with 
enforcement.271 Unfortunately, this plan fails to address a major concern in the fight 
against data breaches. It offers no solution for less-motivated providers where 
voluntary compliance schemes without penalties can result in a lack of corporate 
commitment to comply with the privacy standards putting consumers at risk.272 This 
purely economic model should be rejected because it provides no regulatory 
authority to the state government, which has an interest in protecting its citizens. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Time will tell if HIPAA’s 2009 amendments will provide the incentive covered 
entities need to protect personal health information better. However, time is a 
commodity that patients and consumers don’t have. Every day, there are more and 
more victims of medical identity theft. This note in no way, shape, or form 
                                                          
 266 Customer defection means losing business. See Total Quality Management, Customer 
Focus and Satisfaction, September 12, 2008, 
http://totalqualitymanagement.wordpress.com/2008/09/12/customer-focus-and-satisfaction/.  
It occurs when unhappy customers decide to stop hiring a company or purchasing a 
company’s services or products. See id. Customers also decide to find some other suitable 
alternative that satisfies their needs. Id. 
 267 Robert Westervelt, Survey: Data Breach Costs Surge (Oct. 31, 2006), 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid14_gci1227119,00.html. The 
study consisted of 31 companies and each company revealed losses ranging from less than $1 
million to more than $22 million in 2006 because of data breaches. The survey noted that 
costs can be “borne primarily by marketing to avoid customer turnover and customer 
support.” Id. 
 268 See Harold J Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2047 
(1993). “Most individuals will bring suit only when they can expect to receive relief sufficient 
to compensate them for the expense and risk of litigation.” Id. at 2048. “Litigation to enforce 
statutory and constitutional rights may benefit a wide swath of society, even when the stakes 
for any one individual are too small to prompt suit. Id. 
 269 See Romanosky et. al., supra note 23, at 3. 
 270 See id. 
 271 See Murphy, supra note 205, at 184-85. 
 272 See id. at 185. 
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encourages Ohio’s legislature to jump haphazardly into creating statutes to give the 
appearance that it cares about the privacy of its resident’s health information. 
However, the legislature should strongly consider all of the interests involved and 
conduct further research to determine the best proactive course of action. After all, 
Ohio’s constitution conveys that “[w]e, the people of the State of Ohio, [are] grateful 
to Almighty God for our Freedom, to secure its blessings and promote our common 
welfare.”273 It would be illogical to conclude that the intent of this constitutional 
mandate was for the state legislature to punt its responsibilities to protect Ohio 
citizens to the federal government. 
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